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LAW REVIEW
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Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law N 3
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
SEARCHES BY STATE AUTHORITY
By BEN ELY, JR.*
A recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court' suggests some in-
teresting problems in the law of search and seizure. The facts of the
case were these :2 One Byars was tried and convicted in the District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa upon an indictment charging
him with the felonious possession of certain counterfeit revenue stamps
made to imitate those used on bottles of bonded whiskey. His convic-
tion was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and in that
Court the judgment below was reversed and the defendant discharged.
The following circumstances gave rise to the prosecution: A police
officer of the City of Des Moines filed with the municipal court of that
city a complaint in which he stated,
that the affiant has good reason to believe and does believe that
defendant has in his possession intoxicating liquors.
This complaint accurately described the place where the above men-
tioned liquors were kept and was verified on oath by the applicant.
The Municipal Court thereupon issued a search warrant in proper form
directed to any peace officer of Des Moines, Polk County, Iowa. This
warrant was placed in the hands of one Densmore, a city policeman.
As Densmore and certain other police officers were about to start for
* Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Missouri.
'Byars v. United States (1927) 71 Law. Ed. 331, - U. S.-, - SuP. CT.-,
reversing 4 Fed. (2nd) 507.2 The facts of the case as herein stated are taken in part from the opinion of
Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Supreme Court and in part from that of Judge
Van Valkenburgh in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
defendant's home they met one Adams, a Federal Prohibition Agent,
and requested him to accompany them. When they arrived at the res-
idence of defendant, Densmore instructed each member of the party
including Adams to take charge of one room in the house and search
it. During the course of this search Adams found some twenty of
the counterfeit stamps mentioned upon the possession of which the
first count in the indictment was bottomed. One of the State police
officers found fifty-four similar stamps in another room, and it was
with the possession of these stamps that the defendant was charged in
the second count. Before the trial defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence gained by this search because of the alleged invalidity of
the warrant which he claimed violated both Federal and State Consti-
tutional provisions. This motion was overruled on the trial, similar
objection to this evidence was made ore tenus and this was also over-
ruled. Defendant was convicted under both counts of the indictment
and in the appellate courts, assigned error upon the admission of the
evidence mentioned.
The court speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, declared that
the warrant was illegal under the Fourth Amendment, if that consti-
tutional provision applied to the case, since the complaint on which it
was issued was sworn to on "information and belief" only.3 It further
held that the fact that a federal officer was present made the search a
federal one and hence it came within the perview of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
4
It is believed the basic principle necessarily implied in the court de-
cision will, if carried out to its full logical extent, profoundly affect
the whole law of search and seizure. It will be profitable therefore to
critically examine its precise nature and probable future development.
We shall attempt to answer three questions: First, what is the prop-
osition of law upon which in the last analysis the court's decision must
be based? Second, what result will the acceptance of that proposi-
tion have upon the future development of the law of search and seizure?
Third, will these effects prove beneficial or otherwise? Before at-
tempting to answer these questions, however, it will be advisable to re-
state certain fundamental principles concerning the construction of
the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution which ought to be
tolerably obvious but which of late have been to a certain extent over-
looked by the profession and occasionally disregarded by the courts.
(1) The Fourth Amendment does vot in any way apply to the states.
It has reference alone to the Federal Government. The Articles of
' 71 L. Ed. at p. 331. " 71 L. Ed. at p. 333.
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Confederation of 1777 had granted to the Central Government no power
of action against the individual citizen.5 The legal relations of the
Confederation were with the states alone. All of this was changed
by the Constitution of 1789, and while the new Federal Government
was given broad powers directly affecting the activities of its citizens,
no adequate restraint was provided to prevent the abuse of those powers.
Even before the Constitution had been ratified there arose a popular
demand for the inclusion in the instrument of certain guarantees of
personal rights as against the Federal Government. The states looked
on the broad powers of that government with jealousy, and the sympathy
of the people was with their local governments rather than with the
new central power. In response to this popular demand the first ten
Amendments were submitted. The purpose was to guarantee personal
rights as against possible aggression on the part of the National Gov-
ernment.6
Immediately upon the adoption of these Amendments however coun-
sel began to try to apply them to state legislation. In 1833 the court
definitely decided that the Fifth Amendment had no application to
the states.7 John Marshall, who had been a member of the Virginia
Convention which ratified the Constitution, and had taken part in the
discussion at the time of the submission of the Amendments, delivered
the opinion of the court, using the following language:
But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the
day, that the great revolution, which established the Constitution,
was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were
extensively entertained that those powers which the patriotic states-
men who then watched over the interest of our country deemed
essential to union and to the attainment of those invaluable objects
for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dan-
gerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Con-
stitution was ratified, Amendments to guard against the abuse
of power were recommended. These Amendments demanded se-
curity against the apprehended encroachments of the general gov-
ernment not against those of the local government.
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed to quiet
fears, thus extensively entertained, Amendments were proposed
by the required majority in Congress and were adopted by the
'See the Articles as printed in BEARD, READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS (1913) 25.
'BARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1917) 63; CURTIS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE U. S. (1889) Vol. I p. 669 quoting a letter of Thos. Jef-
ferson, Argument of Madison, ANNALS OF CONGRESS Vol. I pp. 440 et seq.; Re-
port of Select Committee, GAZETTE OF U. S. Aug. 1, 1789.
'Barron vs. The Mayor, etc., of Baltimore (1833) 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672.
* 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 700.
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States. These Amendments contained no expression indicating
an intention to apply them to the State Government. This Court
can not so apply them.9
It was not until 1855 that the question of the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the States arose. In that year the Court de-
cided the Case of Smith v. Merrill,0 upholding a search and seizure
Statute upon the ground that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable
to the State Government. The Court said that the Amendment:
restrains the issue of warrants only under the law of the United
States and has no application to state process.11
The Court cited with approval Marshall's decision in the case just
quoted together with a line of intervening cases under the Fifth Amend-
ment.12 Although courts have overlooked this principle at times it
has been again and again reiterated in well reasoned decisions. 3
(2) The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches made with-
out warrant or legalize all searches made under the authority of a war-
rant.14  It forbids only unreasonable searches (whether nade with or
without warrant) and it legalizes all reasonable searches.15 There are,
of course, circumstances under which a search could be called reasonable
only when made with a search warrant. In these cases if the warrant
be invalid, the search will therefore be illegal. There are other cases
in which the search is reasonable even if the officer have no warrant.'0
Hence if he has a warrant which is illegal-in the sense that the issuing
judicial officer was without power to issue the same or erroneously ex-
'8 L. Ed. at p. 675. 10 (1855) 18 How. 71, 15 L. Ed. 269.
' 15 L. Ed. at p. 270.
' Holmes v. Jennson (1840) 14 Pet. 540, 10 L. Ed. 579. See in particular the
opinion of Thompson, J. 10 L. Ed. at p. 600, 14 Pet. at 582 and that of Barbour,J. 10 L. Ed. 602, 14 Pet. 587; Morris v. Lessee of Harmer's Heirs (1833) 7
Pet. 552, 8 L. Ed. 781; Fox v. Ohio (1847) 5 How. 1. c. 434, 12 L. Ed. 213.
' See e. g. the decision of the federal Supreme Court in the case of United
States v. Cruikshank, (1876) 92 U. S. (2 Otto) 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 and cases
cited 23 L. Ed. at p. 591 (decision as to the effect of the First Amendment) ;
United States v. Grosby (1871), 1 Hughes 448, Fed. Cases No. 14893; Reed v.
Rice (1829), 25 Ky. (2 J. J. Marsh) 44, 19 Am. Dec. 122; State v. Atkinson(1894) 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1020,42 Am. St. Rep. 877; State v. Brennan, (1891)
2 S. D. 384, 50 N. W. 625. Crawford v. United States (1925) 5 Fed. (2d) 672(C. C. A. 6th Ct.) ; see also Comments, (1927) 37 YALE LAW JOURNAL 536 at 537.
" Carrol v. United States (1924), 26 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543.
'The text of the Amendment is as follows: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
' Carrol v. United States supra note 14; State v. Hall (1926) 278 S. W. 1028;
McFADDEN, THE LAW OF PROHIBITION (1925) 28; 29 Comments, (1926) 35
YALE LAW JOURNAL 612, Comments (1927) 37 YALE LAW JOURNAL 356 at 541.
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ercised his power-the search will, nevertheless, be proper.17  In yet
other cases, where the search is made under a valid warrant, the man-
ner of executing it is unreasonable and the search is therefore illegal.
In this connection it is well to remember that this concept of reason-
ableness is one whose content varies with changing social and economic
conditions. In adopting constitutional standards we did not place in
our fundamental law groups of static and unchangeable principles, but
rather general concepts having a meaning derived from history and em-
bodying within themselves "the evolutionary process inherent in their
origins." '18 Thus, circumstances which yesterday would not have war-
ranted an official search of private property without warrant, may to-
day provide ample justification for such action.
(3) The Fourth Amendment contains two distinct parts establishing
as law two different propositions. The first provision is contained in
the words, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated." It lays down the general requirement of reasonableness
for all searches. A careful analysis of its jural consequences shows
that it creates a right-duty relationship 9 between each Federal minis-
terial officer and each citizen. The citizen has a right as against the
officer that the latter shall not unreasonably search or seize his person
or property. The officer is under a correlative duty to the citizen.
The second proposition contained in the Amendment is stated in the
following language: "And no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The
jural consequence of this provision is the creation of an immunity-dis-
ability20 relationship between the citizen and the Federal judicial officer.
It does not directly affect the rights of the citizen in respect to the seizure
of his body or the search of his home. It merely makes it impossible
for Congress to grant to the Federal judicial officers the power to is-
sue warrants except under certain specified circumstances viz: the show-
ing of probable cause, the filing of a sworn complaint, the particular
,State v. Graham (1922) 295 Mo. 695, 247 S. W. 194.
Borgnis v. Falk Co. (1911) 147 Wis. 327 at 348, 133 N. W. 209 at 215.
"Wherever legal relationships whether right-duty, privilege-right, power- lia-
bility, or immunity-disability are referred to herein these terms are used in the
sense given them by the late Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld. See HOHFELD, FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1923) Chapt. I
as to the nature of the rights duty relationship as that term is used herein see in
particular HOHPELD Op. Cit. p. 36 et seq CORBIN, RIGHTS AND DUTIES (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL 504.
" For the term power-liability relationship as used herein see HOHFELD Op.
Cit. p. 50 et seq.
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description of the place to be searched and of the person or thing to be
seized. In the whole of our future discussion it will be necessary to
keep clearly in mind the exact legal relationships created by each clause
of the Amendment.
(4) The Amendment does not itself make evidence obtained by a
search which violates its inhibitions inadmissible in a criminal prose-
cution against the person whose constitutional rights have been violated
by the search.21  The privilege that evidence so obtained shall not be
used is one created by the courts. It exists because it is the only prac-
tical sanction for the provisions of the Amendment. The form of com-
pulsion which society originally offered to enforce the right of freedom
from unreasonable search was a damage suit against the officer making
the search. But this sanction proved socially undesirable. First, it
was unwieldy and difficult to use and therefore gave the citizen insuffi-
cient protection. A second and far more important reason for its grow-
ing disuse is that it penalizes the active and honest officer who, in his
zeal for law enforcement, makes a mistake in deciding when the cir-
cumstances warrant a search. Thus, as the old remedy of a damage
suit against the officer proved ineffective the courts developed this new
rule. Evidence obtained by an illegal search in violation of the Amend-
ment will on proper motion be suppressed. 22
Having thus analyzed the general meaning and legal effect of the
Amendment let us apply these principles to the case under review, to
'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) sections 2183 et seq. -IARNO, EVIDENCE OBTAIN-
ED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1925) 19 ILL. LAW REV. 303; CHAFEE, THE
PROGRESS OF THE LAW; EVIDENCE, (1922) 35 HAR. LAW REV. at 695; FRANKEL,
CONCERNING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (1921) 34 HARv. LAW REV. 361; ATKIN-
SON, PROHIBITION AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE WEEKS CASE (1925) 23 MICH. LAW
REv. 748, see also the remarks of White J. in
' Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 392. The reasoning of Dean Wig-
more to the effect that the unlawful obtention of the evidence does not in any
way effect the criminality of the defendant's act and hence ought not to prevent
his punishment is unanswerable. The argument of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in State v. Owens, to the effect that the defendant had merely committed
a petit midemeanor while the searching officer had violated a constitutional
provisions cannot stand the test of careful analysis. The "petit" misdemeanor
which the defendant had committed consisted of a violation of the 18th Amend-
ment of the Constitution. Why a violation of the 4th Amendment should be
more serious than a violation of the 18th we are at a loss to understand. If
there is any difference we would consider the last expression of the popular will
the more binding. On the other hand we believe that the rule of the Weeks
case illogical, as it is justified on the ground suggested in the text. Of course
the fact that the unlawfully obtained evidence can be suppressed does not mean
that the right of the criminal defendant to sue the officer is taken away. But as
a matter of fact if he can have the evidence suppressed and thus avoid criminal
punishment he will not ordinarily avail himself of this right and when he does sue
he will have little success before a jury. If this remedy of suit against the of-
ficer were the only one allowed however it would be used in more cases and
-with greater success.
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determine, if possible, the exact legal proposition which underlies the
court's decision as an unexpressed major premise. It is plain that the
warrant itself was not invalid. It was issued by a state judge and not
a Federal judge. Hence the second clause of the Fourth Amendment
could have no effect upon it. The State Constitution, as interpreted by
the highest court of the state and the laws made in accordance there-
with, gave the judge power to issue the warrant, even though the com-
plaint was sworn to upon "information and belief" alone.26  The fact
that a Federal officer assisted in the search made under the warrant
could not in any way affect the power of the judge in issuing the same.
The decision of the court therefore comes to this, that the issuance of
a warrant upon such a complaint is so arbitrary, wanton, and tyrannical
an abuse of power in and of itself, without the violation of any con-
stitutional guarantee of immunity, that a search made thereunder is
necessarily and intrinsically unreasonable. This being so, the Federal
officer who took part in the search violated the right of the defendant
that he should not make an unreasonable search of defendant's premises.
The secondary sanctional rule mentioned therefore came into operation,
and created in defendant a privilege that the evidence obtained by the
Federal agent's search should not be used against him. Of course this
reasoning could not possibly have applied to the search by the state of-
ficers. 2' The Fourth Amendment did not create any right-duty relation-
ship between them and defendant, and hence the rule of the Weeks case
could not create in him a privilege against the use of their testimony.
Therefore, it is submitted that the decision of the court upon the second
' Iowa Code 1924 Title VI, sec. 1968; Feley v. Utterback (Ia. 1924) 194 N. W.
721. Article I Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution is identical with Fourth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.
"Crawford v. United States (C. C. A. 6th 1925), 5 Fed. (2d) 672; Lerskov
v. United States (C. C. A. 8th 1925), 4 Fed. (2d) 540; Gotterdam v. United
States (C. C. A. 6th 1925), 5 Fed. (2d) 673; Klein v. United States (C. C. A.
1st 1926),14 Fed. (2d)35; Brown v.United States (C. C. A. 9th),12 Fed. (2d) 926;
CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1926) sec. 15, p. 68; CO1MMENTS, (1927) 36Yale
Law Journal, 536, at 538 cf.; Legman v. United States (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924),
295 Fed. 474; United States v. Costanzo (W. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 Fed. (2d) 259;
Suppose that federal officers make a search which is concededly unlawful and
unconstitutional. They discover evidence of the violation of a state law. Prose-
cution is brought in a state court. Can the evidence discovered by the federal
officers be used? The Supreme Court of Missouri has answered this ques-
tion in the negative. State v. Rebasti (1924), 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858; see
also Walters v. Commonwealth (1923), 199 Ky. 182, 250 S. W. 839. A critical
examination of the reasons offered for this decision would carry us beyond the
proper limits of this paper. It is submitted, however, that in no event could
the rule adopted by the Missouri court effect the situation in the case under re-
view. In the first place the federal court is not bound in a prosecution for a
federal offense to turn aside from its purpose to enforce the provisions of a
state constitution. But even if it were it must adopt the construction put upon
the state constitution by the highest court of the state.
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count cannot be supported on any grounds. To contend that the state
officers who had, acting independently of any Federal authority, ob-
tained a state search warrant from a local judge, who had themselves
planned and conducted the raid, who were engaged in a bona fide at-
tempt to enforce a state law, merely because they asked the assistance
of a Federal officer in carrying out the mandate of the state process,
became thereby his deputies and hence Federal officers amenable to the
inhibitions of the Fourth Amendment, is to strain common language
and common sense in a way which puts to shame the most fantastic
subtilities of the medieval schoolmen. We are forced to the conclu-
sion that the learned court overlooked the fact that the second count
was exclusively bottomed upon the evidence obtained by the state offi-
cers. Hence, we believe that this portion of its decision is hardly a
controlling precedent for the future. We therefore must take the prop-
osition above stated as to the alleged intrinsic unreasonableness of the
search as the true ratio decidendi of the case.
Assuming, then, that the case stands for this proposition: what ef-
fect will the establishing of that principle as law have upon the future
development of the rules governing search and seizure? If its con-
sequences are to be limited to those cases in which, as in the case under
review, a Federal officer has aided in the service of a warrant issued by
a state court or judge, they will be of comparatively small importance.
But can they be so limited? The answer to this last question requires
notice of another peculiar recent development of Federal Constitutional
law.
Had an informed student of constitutional theory during the last
decade of the nineteenth century been asked the question, "Does an ad-
mittedly unreasonable search by a state officer, in which a Federal officer
has no part whatsoever, violate any provision of the Constitution of
the United States ?," he would have had little hesitation in answering
the question in the negative. He would have relied no doubt upon the
decisions which have been cited above and which establish beyond the
possibility of argument the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not
and cannot place any limitation upon state powers.25
But Marshall's decision in Barron v. Baltimore with the cases fol-
lowing it, did not satisfy the bar. If some guarantee as against the
states of the rights protected against federal aggression by the first ten
amendments could be found in the National Constitution, a wide op-
portunity would be afforded for attacking state statutes which might
' Cases cited supra notes 7, 10, 12, and 13.(1873) 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.
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prove inconvenient in particular cases. When in 1868 the Fourteenth
Amendment was accepted by the states, its sweeping declarations seemed
to afford a new basis for this contention. It was at first insisted that
the words, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," were to
be construed as placing such rights as freedom of speech and the press,
trial by jury, and freedom from unreasonable searches, under the aegis
of the Federal fundamental law. But in the Slaughter House cases28
the court refused so to construe this clause of the Amendment. Al-
though refusing to define the term privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, the court held that they did not include those rights
which "belong to the citizens of the states as such" and that the various
guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights were not extended to the acts
of the state governments by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
quoted.
The next attempt to extend the scope of the Federal Constitution
came through the application of the "due process" clause of the same
Amendment. This attempt has met with better success than the former
ones whose history we have noticed. It does not lie within the scope of
the present article to describe the steps by which the court has gradually
altered its position. In his excellent article in the Harvard Law Re-
view, Mr. Charles Warren has accurately and exhaustively traced the
various stages of this development.27  It is sufficient here to point out
the last stage of the evolution. In Gitlow v. New York 28 the court as-
sumed jurisdiction to decide the question whether or not a New York
statute infringed the right of freedom of speech.
Mr. Justice Sanford speaking for the court said,
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the 1st Amend-
ment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment from impairment by the states.
Even Mr. Justice Holmes, that inveterate opponent of federal inter-
ference with state action, in dissenting from the opinion of the majority,
and holding the statute unconstitutional, expressly decided of course
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected freedom of speech against
state aggression. His language is significant.
"WARREN, "THE NEW LIBERTY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT" (1926)
39 HARV. LAW REv. 431.
"(1924) 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 461, 69 L. Ed. 1138.
"(1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937.
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The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be
taken to be included in the 14th Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given the word 'liberty' as there used, although per-
haps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of inter-
pretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language
that governs, or ought to govern, the laws of the United States.
Strange language indeed to come from the author of the dissent in
Lochner v. New York,29 but clearly indicative of the position which the
court has definitely assumed.
Of particular interest in connection with the application of this doc-
trine to the question of search and seizure, is the decision in Adams
v. New York. 30  The validity of a state statute allowing, under circum-
stances which defendant contended to be unreasonable, search for and
seizure of gambling paraphernalia, was brought in question before the
Federal Supreme Court. The Court expressly refused to decide
whether an unlawful search by state officers violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, but by entertaining jurisdiction of the case at all seemed
to indicate a disposition so to apply the constitutional guarantee. In any
event, if freedom of speech is a part of the "liberty" of citizens safe-
guarded by the due process clause, then freedom from unreasonable
search must also be.
Assuming that the decision in the Gitlow case will stand as the law
(although we are inclined to agree with Mr. Warren's criticism of that
case), what is the effect of the combined action of that rule and the
proposition decided in the case under review upon state searches? Un-
der the Gitlow case the only test of validity which a Federal court could
apply to a state search is that of reasonableness.-' If state action is
arbitrary and wanton, it may be held to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
20 (1904) 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575.
" Under the rule in the Gitlow case the right of freedom of speech, freedom
from unreasonable search, etc., becomes part of the content of the term "liberty"
as used in the due process clause. Hence to deprive one of his freedom of
speech or to unreasonably search his premises deprives him of his liberty. But
the 14th Amendment does not prohibit all state action which deprives one of
his liberty because that would virtually stop all state legislation on every con-
ceivable subject. Holmes J. dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1922)
261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 at 801. Only such action on the part
of the state as deprives the citizen of his liberty in an arbitrary, wanton, and un-
reasonable manner or without any justification of furtherance of a public in-
terest is prohibited by the amendment. Adkins v. Children's Hospital supra;
Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551, 13 An. Ca.
957; HAND, "DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EIGHT HOUR DAY," (1908) 21
HARv. LAW REV. 495. Hence if the decision of the Gillow case stands, but the
instant case be rejected, only those searches which the court holds necessarily
arbitrary, wanton, and tyrannical in their invasion of individual right would be
held to offend against the Federal Constitution.
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ment. But if reasonable men might differ as to the wisdom or ne-
cessity of the state action-if in short the court can conceive of any
reasonable man supporting the act as proper-it must be upheld. But
the present case holds that any search under a warrant issued upon an
"information and belief" verification is intrinsically arbitrary, wanton,
and unreasonable. Hence, logic requires the court to hold that all state
searches made with such warrants are a denial of due process, and hence
void. It is not intimated that the court will actually so decide. It is
merely asserted that such a rule is the necessary logical result of its
present position.
Practically all of the states in the American Union have constitutional
provisions identical or almost identical with those of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the fundamental law of the Nation. These provisions were all
based upon the common law requirements of a valid search as stated in
Lord Camden's decision in Entick v. Carrington 2  In the last decade
the courts of almost all of the states have been called upon to decide
whether a complaint which states in general language, as does the one
in the case under review, that the affiant has reason to believe and does
believe that contraband property, specifically described, is being kept
on named premises, is sufficient to permit the issuance of a search war-
rant.
In 1921 a Federal District Judge in Wisconsin decided that a war-
rant issued upon a complaint like that in the case under review was
bad. 3 His decision was soon followed in other districts and by some
of the Circuit Courts of Appeal. A few of the state courts adopted
the rule.-' It was said that the Federal and State Constitutions re-
quired warrants to be issued only after probable cause had been shown,
"' (1765) 19 How. State Trials 1029. See also in the same connection Leach v.
the King's Messengers (1765) 19 How. STATE TRIALS 1001, 3 Burr. 1692; Wilkes
v. Wood (1763), 19 How. STATE TRIALS 1153; Wilkes v. Halifax (1705), 19
How. STATE TRIALS 1805.
' United States v. Burnside (D. C. Wis. 1921) 275 Fed. 603, an earlier state
case which suggests the same rule is Tippman v. People (1898) 175 Ill. 101, 51
N E. 872.
"Central Consumers Co. v. James (D. C. Ky. 1922), 278 Fed. 249; United
States v. Ray et al. (D. C. Md. 1922), 275 Fed. 1004; State v. Bird (Mont. 1922),
205 Pac. 241; Peoples v. Dineen (1922), 192 N. Y. S. 905; Giles v. U. S. (C. C. A.
1st Ct 1923), 284 Fed. 208; Colley v. Com. (1923), 195 Ky. 706, 243 S. W. 913;
Price v. Com. (1923), 195 Ky. 711, 243 S. W. 927; People v. Effelberg (Mich.
1923), 109 N. W. 727; Peoples v. Knopha (Mich. 1923), 190 N. W. 731; In re
Liquors (1923), 197 N. Y. S. 758; Queck v. Hawker, (D. C. Pa. 1923), 283 Fed.
942; U. S. v. Kaplan (D. C. Ga. 1923), 286 Fed. 953; Carter v. Com. (Ky. 1923),
247 S. W. 3; Keith v. Com. (Ky. 1923), 247 S. W. 42; Craft v. Com. (Ky. 1923),
247 S. W. 722; Mathingly v. Com. (Ky. 1923), 247 S. W. 938; Peoples v. Warner
(Mich. 1923), 192 N. W. 566; Food Products Co. v. McClure (D. C. Pa. 1923),
288 Fed. 982; Peoples v Perrin (Mich. 1923), 193 N. W. 889; Magen v State
(Okla. 1924), 220 Pac. 666; State v. Lock (Mo. Sup. 1924), 259 S. W. 116.
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that the determination of probable cause was a judicial act and hence
could be performed only by a judge; that the judge could decide that
probable cause existed only upon the basis of evidence adduced before
him, and that this evidence must be set otit and contained in the com-
plaint; that a complaint sworn to on information contained only hear-
say evidence, and one sworn to upon belief stated a "conclusion" of
the affiant; that hearsay and conclusions were no evidence at all, and
hence the court or judge could not therefore determine the existence
of probable cause.
Of course, it may be pointed out that the premises of this elaborate
argument are not universally true. The determination of probable
cause is not necessarily a judicial function. The notion that it is, is based
upon the decision in the Carrington case and its companion cases.
These cases did not so decide. In fact they negative the proposition.
Ever since the reign of Elizabeth warrants had been issued by Privy
Councilors and Secretaries of State-executive and not judicial officers
-and the cases mentioned expressly upheld the practise?3 But even
granting that this is so, and that the judicial officer who issues the war-
rant alone can determine probable cause, it is obvious that in passing
on this question he should be able to make use of evidence which violates
the technical rules as to hearsay, opinions, etc. These rules have been
developed primarily as a control upon the actions of an unskilled and
inexperienced jury, and can rightly have no place in determining the
action of a judge whose special training and long experience have given
him an ability rightly to evaluate evidence which a juror rarely pos-
sesses. 6
At common law warrants to search for supposedly stolen goods were
issued on such complaints.3ra Even the sweeping decision in the Car-
rington case and the other English cases immediately following it did
not deny validity to these warrants. Most of the American Consti-
tutional provisions mentioned date from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth Centuries.3 7 Yet after their adoption in practically every
state, the statute law provided for the issuance of search warrants in
larceny cases upon complaints verified upon information and belief.38
Regina v. Kendal and Roe, 1 Salk, 347, 12 How. State Trials 1299, Holt
144; Entick v. Carrington supra note 32.
' See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) section 4 a. Cf. the reasoning in Watson v.
State, (Neb. 1922) 189 N. W. 620 where the court argues that the constitution
does not fix any rule as to the sufficiency of an affidavit.
'a 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149.
' These constitutional provisions are collected in a note in FRANKELL, sopra
34 HA. LAW REV. 361 with the date of the first enactment of each.
' See e. g. Humes v. Tabor (1850), 1 R. I. 464. Missouri statutory provisions
of the kind are to be found in section 4115 R. S. Mo. 1919 (larceny and em-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/1
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment and co-ordinate state provisions apply to war-
rants for arrest as well as to search warrants. And yet in every juris-
diction such warrants have immemorially been issued, and are still
always issued, on complaints verified on information and belief.39 It
must be remembered, however, that during all of this period the search
warrant was of little practical significance. It was used as a means
of recovering stolen goods and in a few isolated cases of different of-
fenses. No one of course was tremendously concerned about the rights
of a convicted thief. The law of search and seizure had passed through
a stage of great development during Revolutionary days reaching its
climax in the adoption of the constitutional provisions mentioned. But
for over a hundred years it was to lie dormant. The present Century
has witnessed a revival of interest in the subject. The wave of social
and economic regulation made necessary by our growingly complex
social organization had brought forth scores of state laws against gamb-
ling and similar practices, state and Federal pure food and drug laws,
the Harrison Anti-narcotic Law and at last the Eighteenth Amendment.
To enforce laws of this type it was necessary to make use of searches
and seizures by government officers. It is little wonder that conservative
judges should be shocked at this enormous extension of governmental
invasion of individual privacy. It has been almost universally held
that bodies of experts such as the various public service commissions,
workmen's compensation commissions and the like are not bound to
apply the hearsay or opinion rules to evidence before them. It is there-
for submitted that the reasoning on which the decision in the Burnside
case and cases following it is based is unsound.
But of more importance is the practical difficulty experienced in the
application of the rule. Violations of the prohibition law and of other
social and economic regulatory statutes differ to a marked degree in
one respect from the older traditional type of criminal offences. In the
ordinary crime with which our fathers were familiar the offence against
bezzlement), see Halstead v. Brice (1850), 13 Mo. 171, Section 3651 R. S. Mo.
1919, (liquor sold by concealed vendor), section 3622 R. S. Mo. 1919 (narcotic
drugs).
" See as an example of such statutes, section 3849 R. S. Mo. 1919 permitting
the arrest after the prosecuting attorney has filed an information verified only
upon his information and belief. State v. Gregory (1903) 178 Mo. 48, 76 S. W.
907 but cf. State v. Hayward (1884) 83 Mo. 299 and State v. Armstrong (1891)
106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604.
"The writer does not mean to intimate the opinion that the prohibition law is
unenforceable. The position taken in this: if the prohibition law is unenforce-
able it is because our system is not designed to punish offenses which are in-juries to society as a whole rather than to an individual. If the system is in-
capable of development in this regard then all social and economic legislation
will prove unenforceable, a result fraught with tremendous consequences to our
complex modern civilization.
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the state was generally joined with an injury to some private individual.
On the other hand a violation of the prohibition law injures society as
a whole but does no specific and recognizable harm to any particular
individual. In a liquor case there can be no "prosecuting witness" in
the traditional sense of that term. Society, organized as the state,
through its official agents must take the initiative in detecting the vio-
lation of such laws and in setting in motion the machinery of the law
for their prosecution and punishment. If this condition existed only
in reference to violations of the prohibition law, we might dismiss the
whole difficulty by saying that that statute was impossible of enforce-
ment.40 But what has been said concerning prohibition is equally true
of the anti-narcotic law, the law against gambling, the pure food and
drug law, sanitary codes generally, factory inspection acts, hours of la-
bor and minimum wage legislation, and a host of other laws of like char-
acter. Under the comparatively simple form of social organization ex-
isting prior to the industrial revolution such laws were unnecessary.
In the complex society of today civilization cannot exist without them.
But if governmental officers, without the aid of citizens, are, through
their own action, to detect violations of these laws, discover sufficient
evidence to make convictions possible, and initiate prosecutions, the use
of the search warrant is an obvious necessity. Moreover, it is necessary
that the warrants shall be issued on the complaint of the officers and
not that of private citizens as was the case with warrants in larceny
cases. Experience shows that it is impossible to get private citizens to
swear to applications for search warrants in these cases.4 ' This is but
natural since, as we have shown, there is no individual citizen who is
specially injured, or at least who considers himself injured by a vio-
lation of the law. The officer will rarely have direct personal knowledge
of the facts of law violation on premises which he desires to search.
Generally, the knowledge of the prosecutor will be derived from a mul-
titude of intangible factors; hearsay complaints coming to him in anony-
mous letters and telephone calls, suspicious actions of persons inhabiting
the premises reported to him by police, the general character of the in-
mates as known to the officers of the law through their previous ex-
perience. These factors, not sufficiently tangible to put down on paper,
depending on the unsworn statements of many witnesses who could
never be gotten into court or induced to sign an affidavit, are neverthe-
less of sufficient force to convince him to a moral certainty that the law
is being violated in the suspected place. When he swears to the com-
42WAITE, "THE CONTROL OF CRIME" 137 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 214, (February,
1926) Prof. Waite's conclusions are fully borne out by the experience of the
present writer in the office of prosecuting attorney.
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plaint on information and belief he is stating in as definite a form as
possible the resultant of all these factors.
In the last analysis the question here presented, like any other legal
question, is one of balancing the conflicting interests involved. On the
one hand there is the interest of society that its laws should be enforced;
on the other there are the interests of the individuals whose homes are
searched. In the case of the guilty persons whose homes are searched
the individual interest may well be disregarded; for do we not, as a
social consequence of their illegal act, place them in jail thus depriving
them of an interest immensely more valuable than that of privacy of the
home? After all then, it is the interest of the innocent man whose
house may through mistake be searched which must be weighed over
against the interest of society in efficient law enforcement. The law
has long recognized that the social interest in these cases is of more
importance than that of the individual. It has seen fit, however, to pro-
vide certain safeguards so that the privacy of the home will be inter-
fered with only when it is reasonably necessary. It is believed that
the requirement that the complaint shall be sworn to on "information
and belief" affords as large a safeguard against unreasonable action as
is practically possible to give.
Seeing the logical and pragmatic weakness of the rule in the Burn-
side case many state courts have refused to follow it. In a large num-
ber of states it is held that an information and belief warrant is good.4 2
In the majority of jurisdictions where the rule of the Burnside case
is adopted, however, it has been greatly limited in its scope. Thus, it
is generally held that where affiant states positively that defendant has
intoxicating liquor (or other contraband articles) on the described
premises this is sufficient. 43 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, however, in the case of Giles v. United States44 refused to
accept this modification of the rule, and declared that the particular
evidential facts leading the affiant to believe that liquor was being kept
or sold on the premises must be stated in the complaint. This rule of the
Giles case has been pretty generally adopted by the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal. In some courts it is even held that the affiant cannot
" Cochran v. State (Oh. 1923), 138 N. E. 54; Porter v. State (Miss. 1924), 100
So. 377; State v. Mallett (Me. 1924), 122 Atl. 570; State v. Breen (Me. 1924),
122 Atd. 571; Loeb v. State (Miss. 1924), 98 So. 449; Bufkin v. State (Miss.
1924), 98 So. 452; Zimmerman v. Town of Bedford (Va. 1923), 115 S. E. 362;
Foleyv. Utterback, supra note 23.
" Caudill v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1923), 249 S. W. 1005; People v. Kennedy(1921), 303 I1. 423, 135 N. E. 762; State v. Cochran (1926), 278 S. W. 700 (Mo.
Sup.).
" (C. C. A. 1st Ct. 1923) 284 Fed. 208. See also People v. Effelberg (Mich.
1923), 109 N. W. 727.
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state generally that liquor, which he himself has purchased on the prem-
ises in question, was intoxicating, but that he must set out the results
of a chemical analysis of the liquid or other facts from which they,
the court, can judicially determine its intoxicating character."
It is submitted that the present system of allowing each state to solve
the problem of what is a permissible form of complaint for search war-
rant has had a beneficial result. Local courts, familiar with local prob-
lems, can work out their own problems of law enforcement in a prac-
tically workable manner. But if the ratio decidendi of the present case
be applied to its full logical extent, all of this will no longer be possible.
The rule of the Giles and Burnside cases has been elevated from the po-
sition of an interpretation of the language of the Fourth Amendment
to the position of a universally valid rule of reason. Warrants which
are issued upon complaints which violate that rule are intrinsically and
necessarily unreasonable, and searches made thereunder are arbitrary and
wanton abuses of power which violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus
the extreme Federal rule as stated in the Giles case may be forced upon
the states as a part of the Federal Constitutional restriction upon their
action. It is submitted tihat such a result is highly undesirable, that it
would make state participation in prohibition enforcement difficult if
not practically impossible, and would put a stumbling block in the way
of an adequate administration of all social and economic regulations
by the states.
"Central Consumers Co. v. James (D. C. Ky. 1922), 278 Fed. 249; In re
Liquors (1923), 197 N. Y. S. 758. "
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